The slow progress of the United Nations-led talks on political issues should not prevent either the belligerents or the international government from promoting such intermediate measures. The fact that Libya has maintained a minimum level of economic governance against all odds and has even briefly increased its oil exports shows that provisional economic agreements are possible; They could even make political gains by building trust and showing that compromise can be mutually beneficial. However, this requires an external effort to preserve the resolve of local and international actors – especially regional powers, which have oscillated between support for a political solution and support for either party – to preserve the integrity of financial institutions and the perseverance of negotiators. Above all, it is a matter of convincing both parties that they are fighting for a rapidly falling price, and it would be better to accept these steps in order to share a larger pot. By the end of 2015, although great progress had been made with respect to the general principles, the outcome was very different from that of the plan. Rather than reaching consensus on a political roadmap between parliaments and other constituencies, it allowed politicians eager to use the UN framework to identify commonalities with enemies, leaving out those who disagreed on key issues, including the composition of a unity government and a road map for security. These included GNC leaders Nuri Abu Sahmein and HoR leader Aghela Saleh and their constituencies. [fn] [1] The House of Representatives and the GNC initially negotiated four-member delegations, but these represented small interest groups within parliaments rather than the institutions themselves, and Abu Sahmein and Saleh became vocal critics. In June-July 2015, Abu Sahmein insisted that the GNC delegation withdraw, and in October, Saleh refused to call for a hoR vote on the proposed deal, saying the majority was against it. Interviews with the crisis group, members of the GNC, Tripoli, November 2015; Members of HoR, al-Bayda, November 2015.Hide footnote Several other factors contributed to the perception that an agreement was needed quickly. One of them was concerned about ISIS`s expansion into Libya, especially after the Paris attacks in November. Exchange of emails from the Crisis Group, senior UN official, December 2015.
A related fear was that if the opportunity to attack ISIS was not seized, international attention would continue, anti-ISIS operations would refocus on Syria and Iraq, and the momentum to act in Libya would be lost. Interview with crisis group, senior UNSMIL official, Brussels, December 2015.Hide footnote States considered a unity government to be crucial to coordinate a military response to ISIS`s conquest of territory in central Libya and elsewhere. In early 2016, U.S. officials estimated that there were about 4,000 to 6,000 ISIS supporters in Libya, mainly in Sirte, but also in Benghazi, Derna and Sabratha. [fn]”USA general: number of ISIS fighters in Libya double”, CNN, 8. April 2016.Hide footnote A senior US official explained the reasons for the continuation of the Skhirat agreement: International divisions have led to disagreements over the application of sanctions against spoilsport. The EU and the US have imposed financial and travel sanctions on President Saleh and GNC officials, accusing them of creating obstacles to a political settlement. Russian and Egyptian diplomats criticize this as unnecessary.
[fn] On 1 April 2016, the EU imposed a travel ban and asset freeze on President Saleh, Ghwell, the unrecognized Tripoli-based head of government that took place before Serraj`s arrival, and GNC President Sahmein. On April 19, U.S. President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13726 “Block Property and Suspend Entry into the United States of People Contributing to the Situation in Libya.” These measures were adopted on 20 September. April on Ghwell and May 13 on Saleh. Interview with the Crisis Group, Russian official, March 2016.Hide footnote Moscow is also invested in the army commanded by Haftar. Like Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, he has repeatedly called for a relaxation of the arms embargo over the past two years so that Haftar can receive weapons, and has given political support to pro-HoR factions. [fn] Crisis Group telephone interview, Russian official, May 2016. In late May 2016, Moscow authorized a Russian currency to send 4 billion dinars (nearly $3 billion) of banknotes ordered by the Bayda-based Central Bank of Libya (appointed by the HoR and working with the Thinni government) against the will of the internationally recognized Central Bank based in Tripoli (which recognizes the authority of the Presidential Council). “Battle of the banknotes as rival currencies are set to be issued in Libya”, The Guardian, 20 May 2016.The transaction angered U.S. officials, who called the banknotes “fraudulent.” Message from the United States of America on the Central Bank, May 25, 2016.Hide the footnote Unlike the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, however, Russia apparently refrained from providing military assistance to Haftar and maintained relations with politicians in Tripoli. [fn] The Russians and Libyans deny that Moscow is giving weapons to Haftar. Interviews with the Crisis Group, Russian Military Official, Cairo, April 2015; Abdelrazek Naduri, Army Chief of Staff (Haftar), Merj, July 18, 2016. However, according to Saqr al-Jeroushi, haftar`s air force chief, military support could come after Haftar`s trip to Moscow in late June 2016, when he was received by Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Russian Security Council and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. “On Haftar`s recent trip to Moscow, the Russians offered to provide us with everything we needed and on all the terms we wanted: against payment, on credit, without payment – they didn`t care. But we told them we would pay. Interview with Crisis Group, Merj, 20 July 2016. Russian supplies are crucial, as most of the heavy artillery and Libyan Air Force (acquired under Gaddafi) is made by Russia. A U.S. official agreed that Haftar`s military officials are confident that Russia will support them, but questioned whether Moscow really intends to do so. Interview with the Crisis Group, Tunis, September 2016.
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